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Has the Kyoto Protocol induced carbon leakage? We conduct the first empirical ex-post 
evaluation of the Protocol. We derive a theoretical gravity equation for the CO2 content of 
trade, which accounts for intermediate inputs, both domestic and imported. The structure of 
our new panel database of the carbon content of sectoral bilateral trade  flows allows 
controlling for the endogenous selection of countries into the Kyoto Protocol. Binding 
commitments under Kyoto have increased committed countries’ embodied carbon imports 
from non-committed countries by around 8% and the emission intensity of their imports by 
about 3%. Hence, Kyoto has indeed led to leakage. 
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Global warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions is a major public concern around the
world. Because countries' greenhouse gas emissions have global eects, decentralized national
regulation is inecient. The Kyoto Protocol, an international agreement which sets binding
emission targets for 37 industrialized countries and the European Union (EU), has met major
criticism from its beginnings in 1997 onwards. Its principle of common but dierentiated respon-
sibilities excepts emerging and developing countries en bloc and sets widely dierent targets
even for the 37 committed nations.1 Countries like China or India face no binding constraints.
The U.S. did not ratify the Protocol because it did not include the \meaningful" participation
of all developing as well as industrialized countries, arguing that ratication would unfairly put
the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage.
Related to this policy concern, economists have long pointed out the possibility of carbon
leakage: regulation in some countries could change relative goods prices and hence shift produc-
tion of CO2-intensive goods to places that are exempt from such regulation (see, e.g. Copeland
and Taylor, 2005).2 This sort of regulatory arbitrage is particularly important if trade costs are
low and falling. Carbon leakage may oset domestic emission savings achieved through stricter
climate policy. It can even lead to a global increase in emissions if non-committed countries
operate out-dated carbon-intensive technologies and energy sources.
The potential competitiveness loss and carbon leakage have sparked a debate in the U.S.
and Europe about border tax adjustment (BTA) measures against countries that do not take
actions to prevent climate change within the current multilateral agreement. Proposed American
legislation3 contains such a provision and the French president Nicolas Sarkozy has made similar
proposals for the EU. Carbon-related BTAs always have the air of green protectionism and
could be costly if non-committed countries resort to retaliation. So, it is important to assess the
empirical relevance of trade-induced carbon leakage.
A vast computable general equilibrium (CGE) literature tries to assess ex ante the amount of
carbon leakage resulting from the Kyoto Protocol. Carbon leakage is typically measured as the
1The commitments range from a reduction of emissions with respect to the base year 1990 of 21% by Germany
and Denmark to an increase in emissions of 15% by Spain.
2Note that stricter regulation can also depress the world price of energy and thus increase the energy demand
in non-regulating countries (supply-side leakage). In our study we focus on the demand side channel of carbon
leakage.
3E.g., the Clean Energy and Security Act (also called Waxman-Markey Bill).
1emission increase in non-Kyoto countries relative to the emission reduction in Kyoto countries.
The results of the CGE simulations dier depending on parametrization and modeling assump-
tions. They range from moderate leakage rates of 5-40% (for example Felder and Rutherford,
1993; Bernstein et al., 1999; Burniaux and Martins, 2000) to up to 130% (Babiker, 2005). A
recent important contribution by Elliott et al. (2010) nds substantial carbon leakage ranging
from 15 to 25% depending on the tax rate. Ex post empirical evidence on carbon leakage, on the
other hand, is scant. In essence, carbon leakage is a special case of the pollution haven eect,
i.e. the trade eect of environmental regulation.4 The general insight of the pollution haven
literature is that environmental regulation indeed aects trade ows and the location choice of
rms.
To our knowledge, the only study that investigates carbon policy is World Bank (2008). The
authors employ a gravity framework to test for the eects of carbon taxes on bilateral trade
in goods. They conclude there is no evidence for carbon leakage. However, there are poten-
tial problems. First, estimates might be biased due to non-random selection of countries into
the Protocol. E.g., a country's green preferences could be related to both its carbon policy
and its trade ows. Second, dierent sectors might be dierently prone to carbon leakage as
they dier with respect to the carbon intensity of production. Analyzing bilateral trade ows
might suer from a sectoral aggregation bias. Third, a focus on trade ows (rather than on
the carbon content) does not allow to infer on the reallocation of emissions across countries
since emission intensities vary across sectors and countries. Last, investigating trade ows could
underestimate carbon leakage because it disregards adjustments on the intermediate stages of
production. When rms move production to another country, this might have very dierent ef-
fects on emissions relocation depending on whether (energy-intensive) intermediates are sourced
domestically or imported. Levinson (2009) makes this point in a study of the U.S. emission
savings due to trade.
In this study, we propose a novel way to test for carbon leakage. We suggest to investigate
the carbon content of trade to understand whether and by what extent commitments made under
the Kyoto Protocol aect carbon leakage. The carbon content of trade measures all upstream
CO2 emissions associated with a trade ow along the production chain. Hence, climate policy
induced changes in the carbon content of trade reect the full (direct and upstream) extent
of carbon leakage due to relocation of production. Computation of the carbon embodied in
4There is quite a body of literature looking on pollution haven eects. See, e.g. Ederington and Minier (2003);
Ederington et al. (2005); Levinson and Taylor (2008); and the survey article by Brunnermeier and Levinson
(2004).
2trade requires knowledge of the input-output and sectoral emission structure of all investigated
countries. Several studies estimate the carbon content of trade for a cross section of countries
(see e.g. Ahmad and Wycko, 2003; Peters and Hertwich, 2008; Nakano et al., 2009). Only
very recently, Peters et al. (2011) have provided an estimation for 113 regions for the years
1990-2008 based on the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP). GTAP only provides emission
coecients and input-output data for its base years (1997, 2000 and 2004). The estimates for the
years in between are interpolations. None of the studies works with bilateral data and employs
econometric techniques. Therefore, we construct our own database with the bilateral carbon
content of trade for 40 countries, 12 industries, and the years 1995-2007. Our database mainly
builds on OECD and UN data and, contrary to the study by Peters et al. (2011), has yearly
data on emission coecients.
We motivate our empirical approach by a gravity model for CO2. The carbon content of
trade is determined by a gravity-type equation that features climate policy. We show that in
a two-country case (e.g. a Kyoto and non-Kyoto block) a unilateral carbon tax in a country
leads to increased imports of carbon from the country without such taxes. Put dierently,
the trade partner increases its emissions in reaction to the country's tighter climate policy.
We conduct an econometric ex-post evaluation of the leakage eects triggered by the Kyoto
Protocol. The maintained assumption in our analysis is that committed countries have indeed
stricter climate policies. Note that this assumption is hard to put to a rigorous empirical test
because of the plethora of dierent policies adopted by countries. Yet, anecdotal evidence hints
at policy action after ratication.5 Estimating our carbon content gravity model raises several
econometric issues. Most importantly, selection into the Kyoto Protocol is most likely not
random. Here the structure of our data helps. While the observational units in our analysis are
country-pairs (dyads), selection into a multilateral agreement such as Kyoto is done by single
countries (monads) based on that country's position relative to all trading partners.6 So, the
extensive use of country  year dummies eectively accounts for all reasons why a country may
commit at a certain point in time to pollution targets under the Kyoto Protocol.
Our within estimations imply that sectoral carbon imports of a committed country from
an uncommitted exporter are about 8% higher than if the country had no commitments. The
carbon intensity of those imports is about 3% higher. The empirical evidence also hints at
technological clean-up in Kyoto countries. Sector by sector, we nd robust evidence for carbon
5See data displayed on www.lowcarboneconomy.com/Low Carbon World/Data/View/12.
6See Copeland and Taylor (2005) for a theoretical argument on the optimal choice of carbon policies.
3leakage for at least ve out of twelve sectors. The aected sectors include such likely candidates
as basic metals, other non-metallic mineral products or paper and pulp. Wood and wood
products or textiles, on the other hand, seem unaected by leakage. The ndings are robust, in
particular to using a model in long rst-dierences. They highlight the importance of subjecting
all countries of the world to binding emission targets. The results also imply that countries'
domestic emissions are poor measures of their overall impact on climate change.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the gravity model for CO2. Section 3
describes our data. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and section 5 presents the results
and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 Gravity for CO2
This section develops a simple partial equilibrium model of indirect bilateral trade in CO2
emissions. The objective is to propose a simple theoretical framework which (i) delivers a gravity
equation for the carbon content of bilateral trade, and (ii) provides guidance in the theory-
consistent accounting for embodied CO2 emissions. To meet these aims, the model must allow
for domestic and imported goods to be used as intermediate inputs and for technology dierences
across sectors and countries. The model can also be used to carry out simple comparative statics
and a decomposition of carbon policy eects into scale, technique and composition eects.7
2.1 Consumers
There are K countries, indexed i;j;k = 1;:::;K; which are structurally similar, but may dier
with respect to climate policy or country size. Each country consumes a manufacturing good
Mi and a homogeneous good Hi. The manufacturing good is a Cobb-Douglas composite of
goods Ms
i from S sectors, indexed s = 1;:::;S: s denotes the expenditure share of sector s in
manufacturing, with
P
s = 1: The dierentiated varieties within each sector s are home-made
as well as imported. Ns
j denotes the number of symmetric varieties produced in country j.
Agents have CES preferences over quantities of varieties qs
ij. Overall utility is given by:















7The distinction of scale, technique and composition eects of changes in trade ows goes back to seminal
work by Grossman and Krueger (1993) on the environmental eects of NAFTA.
4where s > 1 is the sectoral elasticity of substitution.8
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ij  1 is the usual iceberg trade cost factor and ps
j is the
mill (ex-factory) price of a dierentiated variety in country j.
2.2 Firms
Output of the homogeneous good sector is freely tradable and acts as numeraire. It is produced
under perfect competition from labor with a constant marginal productivity of one. The ho-
mogeneous good can be consumed. It can also be used as an input, namely fuel. Using the
homogeneous good as the numeraire and assuming that it is produced in every country, wage
rates are equalized to unity so that wi = 1.9
The S dierentiated goods sectors feature monopolistic competition and increasing returns to
scale. Each sector is populated by an endogenously determined mass of symmetric rms, which
each produces a distinct variety. The minimum unit cost function of a rm is cs
i [i;bi;wi];
where the function cs
i [] has the usual properties.10 It reports the cost-minimizing combination
of three inputs { the manufacturing good, fossil fuel, and labor, whose prices are given by i;bi;
and wi respectively. bi = ti diers across countries because of (ad valorem) carbon taxes ti  1;
which are wasteful.11 Alternatively, one could think of ti as regulation to control CO2 intensity





i + fs; (2)
where ys
i is the output level of the rm and fs denotes its xed labor requirement.
8We could additively separably include an externality due to the emissions arising from manufacturing. Since
we focus on the positive and not the normative aspects of the relationship between exogenous climate policies and
rm location, the negative externality would play no role in the subsequent analysis and is left our for simplicity.
9The use of a numeraire sector has a long tradition, see Behrens et al. (2009) for a recent related example
and some discussion. Since the present paper is interested in the empirical relationship between trade in goods
and climate policies, it appears natural to take the prices of fuel, and (essentially) labor as exogenous. The
econometric strategy will be able to accommodate dierences in fuel prices over time and countries.
10It is homogeneous of degree 1, as well as increasing and strictly convex in all arguments.
11We assume that tax income is not rebated, e.g. in a lump-sum fashion, so that income of the representa-
tive consumer is exogenous and depends on country size only. This simplies comparative statics results. The
assumption is not unusual in a multi-country setting with taxes, see e.g. Ossa (2011).
5Prots of a generic rm in country i are given by (ps
i   cs
i [])ys
i   fs: Prot maximization
yields the optimal price ps
i = cs
is=(s   1): Substituting this into prots and recognizing that
free entry forces prots to zero, the size of the rm in equilibrium is given by  ys
i = (s 1)fs=cs
i:
2.3 International trade ows
In what follows, importer countries will be denoted by the index m, and exporters by x. To avoid
notational clutter, the sectoral index is suppressed whenever possible. Maximizing (1) subject










where Lm is country m's income which is equal to its labor force,12 !Lm=Pm denotes real
expenditure allocated to the sector and pmx=Pm is the price of varieties from country x relative
to the average of all consumed varieties in m.
Dierentiated goods are also required as inputs for production. Since rms demand the same
composite manufacturing good as consumers, they have the same demand structure. With the
additional assumption that ci [i;ti;1] = 
i t

i is Cobb-Douglas, where ; 2 (0;1) are the cost
share of intermediates and fuel respectively, the following theoretical gravity equation for goods
can be stated:
Result 1. The quantity of country m's total sectoral imports Qmx from country x is given
by
Qmx = Z  (1 + gm)  Lm  (Pm)
 1  Nx  (cx [])
   (mx)
  ; (4)
where Z  !( 1
 ) is a constant, gm > 0 is a multiplier for intermediate trade, Lm (Pm)
 1
describes country m0s market capacity in a sector, and Nx (cx [])
  is country x0s supply
capacity.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that (4) diers from the usual gravity equation (discussed, e.g., in Redding and Venables
(2004, p. 57 f.), from where we borrow the terms market and supply capacity) in two ways:
rst, Qmx is not the value but the quantity of bilateral trade (so that the exponent on trade
costs is   and not 1   ); second, the trade multiplier gm accounts for trade in intermediate
goods. gm increases in the cost share of the nal good. Moreover, gm also reects comparative
12This includes income generated in the extraction of fossil fuel.
6advantage in dirty versus clean goods production. When a country has a comparative advantage
in the homogeneous clean good (e.g. due to a stricter climate policy) the country produces and
exports relatively more of the homogeneous good and dierentiated goods trade is dampened.
Climate policies will aect Qmx through their eects on market and supply capacities of the
trading partners.













) mi; i = 1;:::;K: (5)
Condition (5) states that the supply of a variety has to equal its demand inclusive of trade costs
from all importing countries.
2.4 The carbon content of bilateral trade
In the present paper, the objective is to empirically analyze whether carbon policies have af-
fected the location of emissions through international trade of goods. Sectors are linked via
input-output (I-O) linkages. Empirically, emissions by upstream sectors often dwarf direct ones
and relevant upstream sectors produce carbon-intensive inputs that are scarcely traded interna-
tionally (e.g., electricity). Hence, we need to understand the carbon content of trade, i.e., the
quantity of CO2 that is embodied in a country's trade ows.
It is useful to distinguish between two accounting methods. The rst accounts only for up-
stream emissions of domestic suppliers; we refer to this concept as single-region I-O (SRIO)
method. The second method additionally accounts for foreign upstream emissions caused by
imports of intermediates; in line with the literature, we refer to this as multi-region I-O (MRIO)
method. The SRIO approach uses the exporter's I-O table Bx (with dimensionality S S) and
computes the matrix of input requirements according to the Leontief inverse Ax = (I   Bx)
 1 :
As shown by Treer and Zhu (2010) in the context of a more standard factor content of trade
study, the MRIO approach diers from the SRIO approach simply by using a multi-regional
input-output table B, i.e., a KSKS matrix whose elements are bilateral I-O matrices, denoted
Bji, which record country j0s usage of intermediate goods supplied from country i. Computa-
tionally, the SRIO and MRIO methods dier only with respect to the dimensionality of the
inputs requirement matrix.

















The row vector es
x collects only the exporters' sectoral emission coecients while es is the collec-
tion of all those vectors world-wide. The column vector As
x reports the exporter's sectoral input
coecients (column s in the domestic Leontief-inverse), while ~ As
x is the vector of world-wide
input requirements of sector s in country x (column S(x   1) + s in the multi-region Leontief
inverse).
Proof. See Appendix.
Substituting equation (4) into (6), one obtains a gravity equation for CO2. Climate pol-
icy aects the carbon content of trade through emission intensities x;m, market and supply
capacities and the intermediates multiplier.
The MRIO method is required when one is interested in a country's total carbon footprint.
However, for the purpose of the present empirical analysis, the SRIO approach is preferable. The
reason is that changes in the SRIO CO2 content of trade mirror changes in the trade partner's
CO2 emissions only. So, the SRIO model allows inference on the amount of emissions (direct
and upstream) relocated to a trade partner when country i strengthens its climate policy |
i.e. carbon leakage. The major drawback of the MRIO method is that eects in the trade
partner cannot easily be disentangled from eects in third countries. The SRIO method, on the
other hand, ignores the fact that country i's stricter climate policy may aect from where the
trade partner and other countries purchase their inputs { which in turn aects the location of
emissions, too. For these reasons, we report results based on both the MRIO and the SRIO
approaches.
2.5 Climate policy and the CO2 content of bilateral trade
Before we turn towards the empirical analysis of gravity equation (6), we characterize the com-
parative statics of carbon policies in a simple special case of the model. As is customary in
the theoretical literature (Antweiler et al., 2001), we can decompose the sectoral eect of envi-
ronmental policy in the presence of international trade into two terms: a technique eect that
relates to the substitution away from energy towards other factors of production, and a scale
eect which is driven by the change in the cost of production relative to other countries and
8therefore to the volume of sectoral imports.13 In principle, the importer's technique and scale ef-
fect are both aected by own carbon taxes as well as by the ones of foreign countries. Neglecting
third country eects, and using ^ x = dx=x, linearizing Emx = xQmx yields
^ Emx = ;m^ tm + ;x^ tx | {z }
technique eects
+ Q;m^ tm + Q;x^ tx | {z }
scale eects
; (7)
where ;j denotes the elasticity of a variable  with respect to j's carbon tax, with  2
f;Qg;j 2 fm;xg:
In a model featuring I-O linkages, it is not feasible to nd a closed form solution for the
elasticities in equation (7) because one would have to solve for the number of varieties Ni in (5).
However, the special case of no intermediates trade (i.e. the cost share  of the intermediate
is zero) lends itself to analytical expressions for the scale and technique eects. A rm's unit
cost function then only depends on its own country's climate policy and is given by cx [] = t

x.
Applying Shephard's Lemma, the emission intensity is x = ex = (tx) 1: Solving for Nx
14











where ij  (ij)1  and Fj denotes a trade-cost weighted measure of j's market potential.




'k : 'jk is an entry of the inverse trade cost matrix and 'k 
PK
i=1 'ki(ti)( 1) is a cost-weighted measure of country k's inverse centrality (proximity to
trade partners). Note that the trade volume directly depends on the exporter's carbon tax tx
with an exponent of  . Climate policy of all countries enters through the last term. It is a
measure of the exporter's (size-, distance- and cost-weighted) centrality relative to all countries.
A change in a country's climate policy aects its costs and therefore its proximity to other
countries.
13On the aggregate bilateral trade level, there is a composition eect in addition which is driven by the change
in the mix of traded goods.
14Details are provided in Appendix A.3.
9Result 3. The technique and scale elasticities of carbon taxes in the importer and the exporter
countries are given by
;m = 0;
Q;m =





;x =  (1   ) < 0;






where   j=x is the ratio of some country j's share in varieties relative to the exporter's
share in world varieties, and ;i is the elasticity of  with respect to i's carbon tax, i 2 fm;xg.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the importer country m imposes a carbon tax while the exporter country x remains inactive
(i.e., i = m; ^ tm > 0; ^ tx = 0); there is no technique eect, since in our special case country m0s
tax does not have any price eect in country x, so ;m = 0:15 The sign of the scale eect
Q;m depends on the eect of increased costs in m, and on x's relative proximity, which in turn
depends on all bilateral trade costs. While generally ambiguous, in the two-country case country
x increases the share of varieties it produces (i.e. its competitiveness in manufacturing) so that
imports Qmx increase and, hence, Q;m > 0.16
If the exporter country x imposes a carbon tax while the importer m remains inactive (i.e.,
i = x; ^ tx > 0; ^ tm = 0), country m0s carbon imports are decreased by the technique eect, since
country x lowers its carbon intensity with an elasticity of ;x =  (1   ) < 0. The sign of the
scale eect Q;x is, again, ambiguous. The direct eect of ^ tx > 0 is to lower the trade volume
with an elasticity of  . In a two-country world, Q;x < 0 as country x loses competitiveness
so that the volume of its sales falls unambiguously.
Summarizing, we expect the carbon content of imports to rise if the importer is committed
under the Kyoto Protocol and to fall if the exporter is committed. The higher the elasticity of
substitution  and the higher the carbon intensity of a sector , the stronger is the reaction
of the carbon content of trade to climate policy. However, those predictions are derived under
strong assumptions. It will be left to the empirical exercise to determine the sign and magnitude
of scale, technique and the overall eect of the Kyoto Protocol.
15This would be dierent if the world-wide price of carbon fuels were endogenous. Note, however, that the
reduced world fuel price would only strengthen the eects. So we can disregard it without loss of generality.
16Detailed expressions for the elasticities are provided in Appendix A.3
103 Data
3.1 Data sources
In this section, we use Result 2 to construct a novel dataset of the CO2 content of bilateral
trade ows for the period 1995 to 2007. Three types of data are required: input-output tables,
sectoral CO2 emission coecients, and bilateral trade data.
Input-output tables. I-O tables allow accounting for upstream emissions of CO2. The OECD
provides harmonized I-O tables for a total of 40 countries (its members plus other countries
including Brazil, Russia, India and China). A key feature and a novelty of that data is the
presence of a time dimension for the major share of countries. I-O tables are observed around
the years 1995, 2000, and 2005; for 37 out of 40 countries, we have at least two tables per
country.17 The OECD input-output tables contain 48 industries (2 digit ISIC). Unfortunately,
we have to aggregate the I-O data to 15 industries to match the available emissions data.18
When taking other countries' upstream CO2 emissions into account (in the MRIO model), we
would need to know from which country each sector sources its imported inputs. In other words,
we need bilateral I-O tables. Such data are not available. However, we observe s
ij, the share
of imports from country j in country i0s total absorption of sector s inputs. Following Treer
and Zhu (2010), we assume that this share applies equally in all sectors in country i that make
use of input s. For example, if the U.S. imports 20% of its steel absorption from China and a
sector uses steel as intermediate input, then we assume 20% of this steel was sourced in China.
Consequently, the bilateral input-output table of country i with country j is
Bji = ij  Bj; (9)
where Bj is the reported I-O table of country j and ij is a column vector containing the shares
s
ij.
17We used the I-O tables from 1995 for the years 1995-97, those from 2000 for 1998-2002, and those from 2005
for 2003-2007.
18Table B-I in the appendix shows the sectoral breakdown. There is an obvious trade-o between country
coverage and the level of sectoral disaggregation. Our focus on international trade links forces us to include as
many countries as possible, possibly at the risk of some aggregation bias.
11Trade data. We obtain bilateral trade data (f.o.b.) from the UN Commodity Trade (COM-
TRADE) database.19 We use a concordance table provided by Eurostat to translate the data
from the SITC commodity classication into ISIC. Prior to 1999, bilateral trade data for Bel-
gium and Luxembourg are reported jointly. Therefore trade, output and emissions data of both
countries are aggregated.
Sectoral CO2 emission coecients. We use information on the level of sectoral CO2 emis-
sions from fuel combustion reported by IEA.20 In order to obtain emission coecients, we need
to divide sectoral emission levels by some measure of sectoral output. Whenever possible, out-
put data come from the OECD's Structural Analysis Database (STAN). When data is missing,
we use the Industrial Statistics Database (INDSTAT4) of the UNIDO and the UN System of
National Accounts. For some countries and years, however, sectoral output data are missing
altogether so that our data set is unbalanced. This is no major problem for our econometric
analysis. A detailed data description is relegated to the Data Appendix.
Other covariates. GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US $) stems from the World Develop-
ment Indicators (WDI) 2010 database. Bilateral distance measures and dummies for contiguity
and common language are taken from the CEPII distances database. Information on joint FTA
membership comes from the WTO. The EU and WTO dummy are constructed from the home-
page of the EU and WTO, respectively. Information on the Kyoto status of countries is obtained
from the UNFCCC homepage.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
We start by looking at trends in country pair's carbon content of trade. To visualize the data, we
divide the sample into a pre-treatment period (1997-2000) and a post-treatment period (2004-
07). All \Kyoto countries" (i.e., countries with binding Kyoto commitments) except Russia have
ratied the Protocol between 2001-03,21 and we choose the pre- and post-treatment periods to
be symmetric around this treatment window. The black bars in Figure 1 shows the dierence
between average sectoral bilateral imports, carbon intensity of bilateral imports and the CO2
19We do not have information on bilateral service trade.
20Other sources of carbon dioxide emissions such as fugitive emissions, industrial processes or waste are disre-
garded. However, CO2 emissions from fuel combustion make up 80% of total CO2 emissions.
21Russia, which ratied in 2004, is treated as Kyoto country. Since Australia ratied in late 2007, it is treated
as non-Kyoto country.
12content of imports (measured using the SRIO method) for an average country pair in three
dierent groups: country pairs where only the exporter is a Kyoto country but not the importer
(-1), country pairs where both or no country is a Kyoto country (0), and pairs where only the
importer has a Kyoto commitment but not the exporter (1).
The left panel in Figure 1 show bilateral imports. It is evident that trade has increased
signicantly in all groups. With an average of 57%, imports of non-Kyoto countries from Kyoto
trade partners have risen the least. For pairs with no or two Kyoto countries, imports have
increased most: by about 75%. The black line shows the linear t and the shaded area the
95% condence interval of a rst-dierenced regression of lnQij;t on Kyotoi;t   Kyotoj;t where
t refers to the pre- or post-treatment periods. The resulting coecient is 0.08. It is statistically
signicant at the 1% level. So, Kyoto importers have a higher increase in import volumes from
non-committed countries.
The results on the carbon intensity of bilateral imports in the middle panel are striking. Car-
bon intensity of imports has dropped dramatically, reecting fuel-saving technological progress
and/or a shift towards greener varieties. For instance, it has fallen by half for the group with two
or no Kyoto countries. But country pairs with a dierential Kyoto commitment of 1 (importer
but not exporter committed) have seen the smallest decrease in the carbon intensity of their im-
ports. The regression yields a coecient of dierential Kyoto commitment of 0.04, statistically
signicant at the 1% level.
Finally, the right panel in Figure 1 repeats the same exercise for the carbon content of
imports. It shows that, for a pair with only a committed importer, the carbon content of
imports grew by about 28%, on average. For country pairs, where either both countries or
neither of them have Kyoto commitments, the carbon content of trade has risen, on average,
by 15% and for country pairs with only a Kyoto exporter by roughly 1%. The rst-dierenced
regression of lnEMij;t on (Kyotoi;t Kyotoj;t) gives a coecient of 0.13 (statistically signicant
at the 1% level). This suggests that a Kyoto country increases its carbon content of imports
after treatment by more than a similar non-Kyoto country.
The results displayed in Figure 1 are suggestive and turn out to qualitatively conrm evidence
based on more elaborate econometrics. They are, however plagued by a number of potentially
important problems. First, as discussed above, both the value and CO2 content of imports
are driven by confounding factors that are not taken account of in the gure. Second, Kyoto
commitments may be endogenous. The next section addresses these issues. Third, Figure 1
does not deate import values. Using the importer's GDP deator leaves the direction of the
eects unchanged. Results are less robust when working with the exporter's GDP deator. The


























































































Note: The bars show the average dierence between pre-treatment (1997-2000) and post-treatment (2004-
07) averages for country pairs where only the exporter has a commitment under Kyoto (-1), both countries
or none of the two have Kyoto commitments (0), or only the importer has Kyoto commitments (1). The
black line shows a linear t and the shaded area the 95% condence interval of a regression of the respective
average sectoral bilateral variable on dierential Kyoto commitment.
right choice of the deator is a contentious issue in the gravity literature. Fortunately, in the
following analysis, the extensive use of country-and-time xed eects makes deation redundant
(see Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007, for a similar argument).
Next, we turn to sectoral bilateral data. The summary statistics of Table 1 show that carbon
intensities of imports dier signicantly across sectors: they are particularly high in sectors
2 (electricity), 3 (metals) or 5 (other minerals) and particularly low in sectors 6 (transport
equipment) and 11 (textiles and leather). The intensities also dier across dierent blocs of
countries: on average, imports from non-committed exporters are about two times as carbon-
intensive as those from committed countries. Interestingly, regardless from where imports are
sourced, the carbon intensity of committed importers is on average about 25% lower than that
of non-committed importers.
144 Empirical strategy
In the following, we empirically estimate gravity equations of the types derived in equation (4)
and (6). Taking logarithms on (6), one obtains a gravity equation for emissions embodied in
bilateral imports that bears strong formal similarity to the standard gravity equation for bilateral
trade in goods.
The empirical implementation of our gravity equations encounters a number of econometric
problems. The three most important are (i) measurement error in the interesting independent
variable (Kyoto status), (ii) selection into the Kyoto Protocol, and (iii) unobserved determinants
of bilateral trade volumes.
4.1 Measuring the Kyoto eect
We do not have comprehensive and comparable information about countries' specic climate
policies and how those relate to the ratication of the Kyoto Protocol. The same problem
occurs in the related literature on the trade ow eects of international agreements. There,
researchers simply dene a binary variable that takes value 1 if the two members of a country
pair are both members in the same free trade agreement (FTA) (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007), or
the WTO (Rose, 2004), or if they are in a currency union (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007), and so
forth. Studies evaluating the treatment eects of international environmental agreements such
as the Montreal, Helsinki or Oslo Protocols take a similar stance and code a binary variable, see
e.g. Ringquist and Kostadinova (2005). Following the literature, we take the year of ratication
of any binding commitments within the Kyoto Protocol as the decisive indicator for a country's





1 if country i has a binding emission cap and t  year of ratication
0 else
;
where t indexes years. For instance, Kyotoi;t = 0 for a country i that has not ratied the
Protocol yet or has no binding emission targets under the Protocol.
Due to the principle of `common but dierentiated responsibility', developing countries have
an en bloc exemption from CO2 emission reduction obligations. However, there is substantial
heterogeneity within the group of countries that have commitments. First, the poorest country
in our sample with a binding commitment under the Protocol is Romania (#99 in 227 countries
ranked according to their 2009 GDP per capita in PPP terms); some of the world's richest
countries have no commitments (U.S.), but also South Korea or Israel. Some EU member states
15such as Malta or Cyprus have no binding obligations. Second, timing of ratication diers across
countries. We have 40 countries in our sample, 12 have no commitments over the entire period
1995-2007. The ratication of commitments by national parliaments started in 2001 (Czech
Republic and Romania). Most countries have ratied in the years 2002 and 2003; Russia has
ratied the Protocol in 2004 and Australia has ratied in 2007.
It is clear that a Kyoto dummy is only a very inaccurate measure for the intensity of a coun-
try's treatment under the Protocol. The resulting measurement error is likely to be substantial.
We can therefore expect that our estimates are biased toward zero. In a robustness check we
use a long dierences-in-dierences estimator on pre- and post-treatment averages. By dening
a broad treatment window (2001-2003), this measurement error should be less severe.22
4.2 Selection into the Kyoto Protocol
There are many reasons to believe that selection into Kyoto membership is not random. First, it
may depend on countries' preferences, their available abatement technologies and their endow-
ment structure. For example, a country that has a comparative advantage in carbon-intensive
goods (i.e., is a net exporter of those goods) may be unwilling to join the Protocol, because it is
set to prot most by a falling world market price of fossil fuel if it remains outside. Or a country
where carbon-free opportunities to produce energy are abundant may nd it easy to commit to
a target while at the same time it already exports low-carbon goods.23 Or, former communist
countries, that have had very carbon-intensive technologies in the early 1990s, may nd it easy
to join the Protocol because they were anyway on the way of adopting new, more carbon-ecient
technologies. Second, a country may be concerned about its international competitiveness. If it
expects important trade partners not to adopt emission targets it may refuse to do so as well.
This has long been and continues to be the position of the U.S.
Hence, we have to deal with the possible endogeneity of Kyoto commitments to avoid spurious
correlations. It is important to note that the decision to ratify the Protocol relates to a country's
position relative to the whole world: if it unilaterally decides to cap its emissions, its cost
competitiveness relative to all trading partners changes. It will join if the share of imports that
22See e.g. Aakvik and Tjtta (2011) for a similar argument on the timing of treatment eects under the Helsinki
and Oslo Protocols which govern sulfur emissions.
23A country that has rich endowments of fossil fuels may refuse to join the Protocol because it wants to keep
the price of fossil fuels high; at the same time it is likely to have a comparative advantage in carbon-intensive
goods so that it has high carbon exports.
16come from countries that are likely to adopt caps as well is large enough and refuse to join in
the opposite case.
Fortunately, the structure of our data oers some ways to control for the relevant deter-
minants of ratifying binding obligations. Since we observe country pairs for a series of years
in every sector, we can control for country characteristics at each year by including dummies
for each country-and-year combination. Since we have 13 years and 40 countries, this amounts
to including a maximum of 520 dummy variables, each representing a country's situation at a
given year. As long as a country's decision to join the Protocol is multilateral (does not depend
on individual trade partners but on their aggregate), inclusion of these country-and-year eects
controls for all conceivable determinants of Kyoto commitments. As the dependent variable in
our gravity equation is bilateral, we still have variance left to identify the eect of dierential
Kyoto commitment.
The major drawback of this strategy is that we can only identify the eect of two countries'
dierences in Kyoto status rather than each country's Kyoto status separately. However, relative
to an instrumental variable approach, its key advantage is its generality. It is dicult to nd a
convincing instrumental variable; the validity of the exclusion restriction can only be assumed. A
second advantage of our strategy lies in the fact that it makes estimation of our gravity equation
particularly easy: we do not have to use proxies for the importer's demand capacity and the
exporter's supply capacity. When we are interested in estimating the eects of the importer's
and the exporter's Kyoto commitments separately, we can only include simple country eects
as the time variance at the country level identies the interesting coecients.
4.3 Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity
Another challenge in gravity modeling is how to deal with country-pair specic unobserved
heterogeneity, due, for instance, to imperfect observability of trade costs. In our context, also
dierences in endowments, climatic conditions or preferences for the environment in a country
pair might aect trade ows as well as the decision to select into the Kyoto Protocol. For these
reasons, we use xed-eects estimation (i.e., include country-pair eects into the regression)
or time-dierentiate equation (6).24 Both strategies have the advantage of controlling for all
historical (e.g., the bilateral trade position at the beginning of the sample) and geographical de-
terminants that may have lead to self-selection of countries into climate policy as well as FTAs.
24This is proposed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007) to estimate treatment eects of joint FTA membership that
suers from the same problem.
17This strategy eectively controls for all time-invariant determinants of bilateral trade in CO2,
including determinants that are country-specic and not country-pair specic. However, it fails
to control for unobserved changes in those characteristics (e.g., if a change in consumer prefer-
ences leads at the same time to less carbon imports and to stricter climate control policies).25
Therefore, the additional inclusion of country-year dummies may be important.
In the context of our exercise, the xed-eects (FE) model is probably preferable to rst-
dierencing (FD). The reason is that our measurement of climate policy through Kyoto status
is prone to measurement error. This resulting bias is known to be particularly problematic in
rst-dierenced models (see Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Moreover, due to the unbalanced
nature of the panel, time-dierencing implies a substantial loss in degrees of freedom. Finally, it
is well known that FE estimation is preferable when error terms are serially uncorrelated while
FD is better when they follow a random walk. So, for most regressions, we report both, the FE
estimates and the FD estimates but tend to prefer the former over the latter.
4.4 Regressions estimated
These considerations lead us to write (6) in estimable form as
lnYmxt = Y;mKyotomt + Y;xKyotoxt + m lnGDPmt + x lnGDPxt (10)
+0POLmxt + 0MRmxt + mx + umxt;
or, alternatively, as
lnYmxt = Y (Kyotomt   Kyotoxt) + ~ 0POLmxt (11)
+m  t + x  t + mx + ~ umxt;
where Ymxt 2 fQmxt;mxt;Emxtg and sectoral indexes are again suppressed.26 The Y;i pa-
rameters dier from those in (7) in that they are not elasticities due to the binary nature of
the treatment variable. POLmxt is a vector of trade policy variables in dummy form (common
WTO, FTA and EU membership). MRmxt is the vector of bilateral multilateral resistance
terms, computed according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009) and accounting for all elements of
POLmxt and for the usual time-invariant bilateral trade determinants such as bilateral distance,
25Country-and-time eects would pick this eect up if it would be proportional for all trade partners.
26It is understood that covariate's coecients are estimated separately for each dependent variable. To keep
notation simple, the respective Y  index is supressed.
18common language, contiguity, and colonial ties.27 mx and mx are country-pair specic inter-
cepts, and the vectors m;x;t collect country m; country x; and year dummies. The error
terms umxt and ~ umxt are assumed to have the usual properties. We eliminate the country-pair
eects either by applying the within-transformation operation or by rst-dierencing. Note that
country pair eects mx nest simple country eects m and x: We argue above that inclusion
of the terms mt and xt allows to account for all determinants of Kyoto commitments;
since equation (10) cannot contain those terms as otherwise Y;m and Y;x could not separately
be identied, there is a risk of obtaining biased estimates as long as time-invariant country
eects do not suce to account for the possible endogeneity of Kyoto commitments.
We run equations (10) and (11) separately for each of our 12 sectors and 3 dependent
variables. We also pool across sectors and run a single regression, treating country-pair  sector
as the cross-sectional dimension.
5 Results
5.1 Pooled regressions: benchmark
Table 2 provides the results of regressions of types (10) and (11). For a rst analysis, we pool
our sectoral data. Odd-numbered models (A1, A3, B1, B3, C1, C3) eectively control only
for all time-invariant country characteristics that may inuence a country's choice to commit
to binding obligations under Kyoto, but allow to identify the eects of importer and exporter
commitments separately. Even-numbered columns (A2, A4, B2, B4, C2, C4) include a full set
of interactions between country and year eects, so that only variables that vary across country-
pairs and time (such as dierential Kyoto commitment, or the stance of bilateral trade policy)
can be identied. These regressions account for all conceivable reasons for which a country may
wish to adopt binding Kyoto commitments.
Columns (A1) to (A4) use the log of imports (in U.S. dollar), Q; as the dependent variable;
regressions (B1) to (B4) use the log of the CO2 intensity of imports, , and regressions (C1)
to (C4) the log of carbon imports, E (computed using the SRIO method). By equation (7),
E;m = ;m + Q;m; E;x = ;x + Q;x and E =  + Q; where the  coecients measure
the percent change of the variable Y = fE;;Qg when an importer m or an exporter x accepts
27In the context of the standard gravity model, Baier and Bergstrand (2009, p. 80) show that the mul-











V 2 flnDIST;COLONY;COMLANG;CONTIG;FTA;WTO;EUg and #k is country k's share in world GDP.
19Kyoto commitments. We refer to coecients Q;m;Q;x and Q as scale eects and to coecients
;m;;x and  as technique eects.
As a general feature, FE models produce larger estimates than FD models, regardless whether
country-and-year eects are included or not. This is not surprising, see our discussion on mea-
surement error in section (4.3). We interpret the FD results as lower bounds of the true eect.
In the FE models (A1), (B1) and (C1), the eect of importer commitment (Kyotom) on
total carbon imports is the sum of the scale eect Q;m; estimated at 0:02 but statistically
insignicant (column (A1)) and the technique eect ;m; estimated to be  0:00 (statistically
insignicant, column (B1)). The sum is 0.02 (statistically insignicant, column (C1)). So,
importer commitment does not lead to changes in either quantity or carbon intensity of imports
from a non-committed country. The positive coecient of 0.02 on the carbon content of trade
would be consistent with carbon leakage. However, the eect is not measured with sucient
statistical precision.
The total eect of exporter commitment (Kyotox) on carbon imports is the sum of the scale
eect (-0.10, statistically signicant at the 1% level), plus the technique eect (-0.08, statistically
signicant at the 1% level). Exporter commitment leads to a technique eect as the carbon
intensity of imports from a committed exporter falls (either because the exporter shifts into less
carbon-intensive sectors or uses less carbon-intensive techniques, or both): This is a cleaning-up
eect. Additionally, export sales of committed exporters go down. This suggests a reduction of
Kyoto countries' competitiveness. The negative scale eect is in line with a leakage eect if the
reduction in export sales is not met by an equal reduction in consumption.
Next, we run regression (11). The inclusion of country-and-year eects controls for endoge-
nous selection into Kyoto commitments but makes separate identication of the exporter and
importer Kyoto eects (Q;m and Q;x) impossible. Instead, we identify the eect of dierential
Kyoto commitment. If the estimates ^ Q;m and ^ Q;x in regression (A1) were unaected by an en-
dogeneity bias, then the estimate ^ Q should be close to (^ Q;m   ^ Q;x)=2; i.e., 0:06: The estimate
of Q reported in (A2) is 0.05, so that the bias resulting from not including country-and-year
eects seems minor.28 Similar observations can be made in columns (B2) and (B3), too. On
average, dierential Kyoto commitment (either the importer is committed and the exporter is
not, or the reverse), increases bilateral CO2 imports by 8%, about half of which is due to a scale
eect and the remainder due to a technique eect. This is again consistent with carbon leak-
28The country-and-year eects present in (A2), however, are jointly strongly signicant (the F-statistic is
101.21).
20age, the positive Kyoto eect implies that, compared to the counterfactual, additional emissions
occur in non-Kyoto countries and are then \imported" by Kyoto countries.
When looking at the results from FD estimation, the cleaning-up eect is supported while
a scale eect of Kyoto commitment is not supported. The total eect is about a quarter as
large as with FE estimation (now the estimated eect on carbon imports is 2%). In sum, there
is strong evidence that Kyoto policies have had non-negligible eects on the quantity, carbon
intensity and total carbon content of bilateral import ows.
5.2 Pooled regressions: robustness checks
Table 3 presents some sensitivity analysis to Table 2. The regressions in Panels A and B use
pooled sectoral data and the same econometric models as those in Table 2. In contrast, they
vary the way the CO2 content of bilateral imports is measured and use alternative samples.
Panel C reports results for aggregated data. To save space, the table only shows results from
FE regressions, reports only eects on carbon intensity and carbon content of imports29 and
suppresses all coecients other than those on the Kyoto variables.30
Alternative measures of CO2 imports. Columns (A1) to (A4) in Panel A use the MRIO
measure of the carbon content of bilateral imports rather than the SRIO one. Comparing
the results to the corresponding columns (B1),(B2) and (C1),(C2) in Table 2, using the MRIO
method to compute the carbon content of trade yields almost identical results. So, results do not
appear to be sensitive to whether upstream emissions in third countries are taken into account
or not.
Columns (A5) to (A6) in Panel A use input-output tables and emission coecients from the
year 2000 for the SRIO computation of the CO2 content of trade, making no use of the updates
for following or past years. Thereby, energy-saving technical progress remains unaccounted for.
Comparing results with those obtained in Table 2, the eects on the importer's commitment on
carbon intensity and carbon imports remain unchanged. However, the eect on the exporter's
commitment on the carbon intensity now is zero. This is an interesting observation. It implies
that the reduced CO2 content of committed countries (as observed in our benchmark regressions
in Table 2) is primarily driven by technical change and not by a change in the composition of
29The eect on bilateral trade volume is the dierence between the coecient on total CO2 imports and the
one on CO2 intensity.
30Details are found in Tables C-I to C-III of Appendix C.
21exports toward less carbon-intensive sectors. Dierential commitment increases CO2 imports by
5%; this is only about 60% of the eect obtained when technical change is allowed for. Alterna-
tively, if only the input-output table is xed in the year 2000 this does not aect the estimated
coecient, see columns (A7) and (A8) for the MRIO case. So changes in the economies' supply
structure play no role for Kyoto's eect on embodied carbon.
Alternative samples. Does the massive increase in Chinese exports following its accession to
the WTO in 2001 drive the ndings in Table 2? Or are the results driven by former communist
countries from Eastern Europe, which have quite substantially reduced their CO2 emissions
due to the rapid modernization of their industries in the aftermath of 1989-1992? Columns
(B1) to (B4) of Panel B report regression output for a reduced sample from which China and
transition countries have been dropped.31 The overall picture remains intact: Dierential Kyoto
commitment leads to an increase in the volume of carbon imports by about 3% (column B4).
In this specic sample, however, dierential commitment lowers the carbon intensity of imports
by about 2% (column B2). The scale eect (not shown), which is the dierence between the
coecient on overall imports and intensity (0:03   ( 0:02) = 0:05, not shown), is strongly
positive, too. The fact that intensity falls may be a sign that China and transition countries
have increased their export sales in labor-intensive and thus relatively carbon-free sectors.
Bertrand et al. (2004) argue that estimated treatment eects could be spurious if both the
treatment variable and the dependent variable have a common trend. This might be an issue
in our framework: Since no Kyoto country has so far withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, once
the Kyoto dummy switches to one it does not change thereafter. Bertrand et al. propose a
long dierences-in-dierences estimator, i.e. estimating the treatment eect with pre- and post-
treatment averages, to cure the problem. Most Kyoto countries ratied the Protocol between
2001 and 2003, so we choose this as our treatment window. The pre-treatment period is 1997-
2000 and the post-treatment period is 2004-2007, see also Figure 1.32 Columns (B5) to (B8)
in Panel B show results for the long dierences-in-dierences estimator on the pooled sectoral
data. Column (B5) again reports cleaned-up exports from committed exporters, but now we also
nd an increase in the carbon intensity of imports for committed importers. Contrary, there is
no evidence that a committed importer increases its embodied carbon imports; whereas Kyoto
exporters export less embodied carbon. Turning to the results with country-and-time eects,
31Excluding only China or only the transition countries does not lead to dierent results.
32Russia ratied in 2004 and is treated as a Kyoto country, Australia ratied in late 2007 and is put in the
control group.
22column (B6) and (B8) support our earlier results. Kyoto commitment of the importer but
not the exporter is associated with 4% more carbon-intensive imports and 10% higher carbon
imports, both statistically signicant at the 1% level. So the earlier results do not stem from
spurious correlation.
Aggregated data. Finally, columns (C1) to (C8) in Panel C report results for data aggregated
over sectors. Compared to columns (B1) to (C4) in Table 2, the sign patterns of the Kyoto
coecients are unchanged. However, estimated coecients are considerably larger. This may
be due to the presence of aggregation bias.
5.3 Dierential commitment sector by sector
In the next step, we run regression (11) sector-by-sector.33 Table 4 reports the results for FE and
long dierences-in-dierences estimation. Dierential commitment has strong eects on total
carbon imports in 8 out of 12 sectors (electricity, basic metals, chemicals, other non-metallic
minerals, transport equipment, machinery, paper and pulp and non-specied industries).34 The
measured coecient ^ E ranges between 8 and 24%. It is highest in carbon-intensive industries
(such as basic metals or paper and pulp) and/or industries in which the degree of product
dierentiation is low.
The reasons for increased carbon imports vary across sectors. Only one sector (paper and
pulp) features positive and signicant scale and technique eects. Leakage in the basic metals,
non-metallic mineral products, transport equipment and machinery sector is solely due to Kyoto
countries signicant increases in imports. On the contrary, in the agricultural, electricity, chem-
icals, textiles and leather and non-specied industries sector the carbon intensity of committed
countries' imports rises and gives thus rise to more carbon imports. In conclusion, some sectors
seem to be more prone to carbon leakage than others. And only some sectors' competitiveness
is aected through Kyoto commitment.
33To save space the regression results without country-and-time eects are not reported. Inclusion of country-
and-time dummies does not fundamentally change the picture. Full regression output is found in Tables C-IV to
C-IX in the Appendix
34One sector (textiles and leather) displays a negative and signicant coecient.
236 Conclusions
We have developed a gravity model for carbon embodied in trade. Stricter domestic climate
policies reduce domestic emissions but may raise them elsewhere as consumers switch suppliers.
This phenomenon { carbon leakage { is equivalent to more emissions embodied in imports and
less emissions embodied in exports. Therefore we suggest to test for carbon leakage with a
gravity-type equation for CO2 embodied in trade within a novel data set of bilateral sectoral
carbon ows embodied in trade ows. When implementing this test for carbon leakage one has
to acknowledge that commitment in the Kyoto Protocol might not be random. The structure
of our data allows us to use country-and-time eects to control for self-selection into treatment.
Furthermore, it also allows us to control for country-pair specic unobserved heterogeneity in
carbon imports and exports.
We show that carbon leakage is empirically relevant. Our within estimations imply that
sectoral carbon imports of a committed country from an uncommitted exporter are about 8%
higher than if the country had no commitments. The carbon intensity of those imports is about
3% higher. The empirical evidence also hints at technological cleaning-up in Kyoto countries.
Sector-by-sector regressions show that some sectors are more prone to carbon leakage than
others.
Note that the nding of increased carbon imports of committed importers from non-Kyoto
countries is a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of carbon leakage. Nevertheless,
we cannot compare our estimates with the carbon leakage measures obtained in CGE studies.
To this end, we would need an estimate of the average Kyoto country's emission savings due to
its climate policy. Due to the problem of self-selection into treatment, this causal relationship
is not easily uncovered in an econometric setup. The inclusion of country-and-time eects is
no feasible option for this problem since this makes identication of the coecient of interest
impossible. A convincing instrumental variable approach for membership in the Kyoto Protocol
would be needed. This is beyond the scope of the present paper.35
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the issue of carbon leakage is a serious challenge to
international climate saving programs. Since a multilateral agreement that commits all countries
to binding emission targets does not exist and looks increasingly unlikely, the rst-best policy to
combat climate change, namely a world-wide cap on emissions, is not feasible. Policymakers in
35Aichele and Felbermayr (forthcoming) provide rst results using instrumental variables estimates on country-
level data.
24the European Union and the U.S. have called for border tax adjustments to tackle the problem.
Establishing the empirical relevance of carbon leakage as a result of unilateral climate policy, our
analysis lends support to these policy positions. Since such taxes pose important informational
problems and may be conceived as protectionist, more research into their design is needed.
Before closing, we want to stress that our empirical strategy was geared toward identifying
the average eect of unilateral climate policy. Our empirical results cannot straightforwardly be
used for the simulation of global CO2 emissions as a response to climate policy scenarios, e.g.,
the potential commitment to an emission cap by the U.S., or the counterfactual situation of no
global climate policy at all. To that end, one would need to use the estimated elasticities in a
structural general equilibrium model. We view this as a challenging but worthwhile avenue for
further research.
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28Table 1: Summary statistics of the dependent variables
Exporter commitment Importer commitment
Sector YES NO YES NO
Variable Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev
1 Imports 57.5 235.9 50.2 209.0 71.4 262.5 43.8 193.4
CO2 intensity imports 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.5
CO2 content imports 22.0 98.1 29.4 133.2 31.6 132.8 25.1 118.8
2 Imports 42.3 240.5 51.5 228.2 53.2 257.0 46.4 220.1
CO2 intensity imports 3.0 2.9 5.7 7.0 3.8 3.7 5.3 6.9
CO2 content imports 107.3 696.5 247.8 1044.1 207.2 1116.4 200.5 861.7
3 Imports 207.0 690.2 136.9 501.5 215.8 655.3 134.3 525.3
CO2 intensity imports 1.4 1.5 2.8 3.0 1.8 1.8 2.7 3.0
CO2 content imports 211.8 757.9 334.2 1475.4 289.3 1014.0 297.4 1396.6
4 Imports 511.1 1606.0 252.5 911.4 480.4 1578.0 269.6 949.6
CO2 intensity imports 0.9 1.1 1.6 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.9
CO2 content imports 192.1 559.9 250.8 960.8 250.0 889.0 224.8 841.3
5 Imports 57.3 173.1 39.1 158.1 57.0 174.4 39.5 157.7
CO2 intensity imports 1.3 0.9 2.6 2.9 1.7 1.7 2.4 2.8
CO2 content imports 55.1 160.8 77.6 380.1 70.5 244.9 70.4 357.1
6 Imports 332.7 1299.6 235.0 1473.3 334.1 1497.5 236.4 1382.4
CO2 intensity imports 0.3 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.9
CO2 content imports 67.4 287.5 95.7 609.8 99.5 564.1 80.7 509.7
7 Imports 843.7 2497.1 649.5 2951.9 819.7 2378.3 662.8 2989.0
CO2 intensity imports 0.3 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.1
CO2 content imports 166.4 555.6 383.4 2967.7 329.8 1878.7 309.0 2700.3
8 Imports 181.6 575.9 120.5 431.7 195.5 598.0 114.6 418.0
CO2 intensity imports 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7
CO2 content imports 53.4 160.3 66.5 281.1 71.0 258.7 58.6 245.8
9 Imports 104.2 346.4 77.8 369.2 107.0 367.6 77.0 359.5
CO2 intensity imports 0.4 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0
CO2 content imports 34.1 144.0 40.9 216.4 38.8 154.3 38.7 212.3
10 Imports 26.8 164.6 21.4 115.8 28.8 85.7 20.5 150.9
CO2 intensity imports 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8
CO2 content imports 9.7 71.8 16.9 126.8 15.2 85.6 14.2 122.3
11 Imports 125.6 376.4 146.6 695.6 170.2 595.6 126.7 620.3
CO2 intensity imports 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7
CO2 content imports 29.7 91.6 130.4 938.5 99.7 667.7 98.1 823.9
12 Imports 326.9 971.3 247.8 1103.3 339.6 1025.1 243.5 1079.5
CO2 intensity imports 0.4 0.4 1.5 1.7 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.6
CO2 content imports 104.0 475.4 245.4 1708.3 182.9 802.8 208.8 1643.8
Note: The table displays summary statistics of dependent variables sector-by-sector. Imports are in Mio







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 3: Regressions on Pooled Data, Robustness Checks
Panel A: Alternative measures of CO2 imports
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8)
Measure: MRIO Technique xed MRIO I-O xed










Kyoto m -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Kyoto x -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.16***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Kyoto m-Kyoto x 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 223,460 223,460 223,460 223,460 223,384 223,384 223,499 223,499
adj. R
2 0.65 0.71 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.06
Panel B: Alternative samples and estimators
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8)
Sample: w/o China & transition countries
c Pre- and post treatment averages










Kyoto m -0.00 -0.00 0.03*** -0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Kyoto x 0.02*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.29***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Kyoto m-Kyoto x -0.02*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Observations 136,392 136,392 136,392 136,392 36,269 36,269 36,269 36,269
adj. R
2 0.53 0.65 0.03 0.06 0.72 0.77 0.07 0.11
Panel C: Aggregate data
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8)










Kyotom 0.02 0.00 0.20*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Kyotox -0.20*** -0.06*** -0.16*** -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Kyotom-Kyotox 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.13*** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 15,422 15,422 13,864 13,864 15,422 15,422 13,864 13,864
R
2 (within) 0.56 0.61 0.16 0.28 0.20 0.26 0.06 0.12
Note: Standard errors (in brackets) corrected for clustering within country-pair; ***,** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a Regressions include controls for country characteristics
(importer GDP and exporter GDP) and all relevant multilateral resistance control variables (i.e., FTA, WTO, EU,
distance, contiguity, common language; see Baier and Bergstrand (2009); not shown).
b Regressions include full set
of country  year eects.
c Transition countries are CZE, EST, HUN, POL, ROU, RUS, SVN, SVK.
31Table 4: Sector-by-sector regressions: dierential commitment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Ln imports Ln CO2 intensity Ln CO2 imports
Method: FE long FE FE long FE FE long FE
(1) Agriculture, forestry, -0.04 -0.02 0.02*** 0.06*** -0.02 0.05
shing (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08)
(2) Electricity, energy, 0.08 0.14 0.05*** 0.10*** 0.13** 0.24**
mining and quarrying (0.06) (0.12) (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) (0.12)
(3) Basic metals 0.20*** 0.21** -0.00 0.01 0.20*** 0.21**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08)
(4) Chemicals and 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*
petrochemicals (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
(5) Other non-metallic 0.14*** 0.17*** -0.00 0.00 0.14*** 0.18**
mineral products (0.03) (0.07) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
(6) Transport equipment 0.15*** 0.18** 0.01 0.01 0.16*** 0.21**
(0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.09)
(7) Machinery 0.13*** 0.10** 0.01 0.00 0.15*** 0.11**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
(8) Food products, bever-, 0.01 0.06 0.01** 0.03** 0.02 0.10
ages, tobacco (0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08)
(9) Paper, paper products, 0.15*** 0.16** 0.02*** 0.04*** 0.17*** 0.19***
pulp and printing (0.04) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.07)
(10) Wood and wood -0.11** -0.15 0.02** 0.05*** -0.08* -0.09
products (0.05) (0.09) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.09)
(11) Textile and leather -0.12*** -0.19*** 0.02*** 0.03* -0.09*** -0.15**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06)
(12) Non-specied industries -0.01 -0.02 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10**
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Note: Each cell is the result of a separate regression. The explanatory variable listed is dierential Kyoto
commitment and takes values (-1,0,1). The method of estimation is either xed eects (within, FE) or
long dierences-in-dierences estimation on pre- and post-treatment averages (long FE). Each regression
includes trade policy controls (joint WTO, FTA, and EU membership) and a full set of countryyear eects.
Heteroskedacticity-robust standard errors (in brackets) are adjusted for within country-pair clustering. ***,
** and * denote statistical signicance at the 1%, 5% and the 10% levels, respectively.
32A Proofs
A.1 Result 1. Intermediate demand by rms
Each sector ` demands the output of every sector as an input via the nal output good. Assuming






m , substituting the
expression for m, recognizing that wm = 1 by choice of numeraire, and applying Shephard's
Lemma, one obtains the unit input requirement for sector-s varieties from country x for the use













Sector-s intermediate goods trade between countries m and x, s
mx, is the respective unit

















































third line follows from multiplying by !Lm
!Lm and noting that N`
mf` = L`
m;HQ is the total amount











with the remaining term in the equation being isomorphic to the expression for trade in nal
goods. Note rst that gm > 0 if intermediate input linkages exist (i.e., if ` 6= 0). Clearly, the
amount of intermediates trade rises with the intermediates input requirement . Intermediates
trade is higher, when the share of headquarter services in the labor force in the importer m is
high. I.e. if a country has a comparative disadvantage in the homogeneous goods sector and
focuses more on the manufacturing varieties (e.g. due to a lax climate policy) it will have a
higher trade volume.
A-1A.2 Result 2. The carbon content of trade
The inter-industry demand for sector ` varieties in sector s is found by applying Shephard's





. Those direct inter-industry demands for all ` and
































The Leontief inverse of this I-O table, Ai = (I   Bi) 1, gives the total input requirement of
all sector pairs along the domestic production chain. That is, the sth column of Ai is the
total demand of sector s for the dierent varieties available. In order to translate this into the
corresponding emissions of a good, premultiply with the vector of direct emission intensities of
all varieties. The domestic carbon content of a sector-s variety is thus the vector product of




The same logic applies for the MRIO accounting method. However, in the MRIO framework
the I-O table captures the input-output relations between all sector pairs in all country pairs,
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where Bji is the matrix of intermediate usage of country i sourced by country j. Bji is again
































Going through the same steps as for the SRIO method, the total carbon content of a sector-s
variety of country i is ~ s
i = e ~ As
i; where e = (e1 :::eK) is the world-wide emission vector and ~ As
i
is the vector of world-wide input requirements of sector-s in country i { i.e. column (S(i 1)+s)
of the world-wide Leontief inverse A = (I   B) 1:
A-2A.3 Result 3. Special case: No intermediates trade
This section draws on results presented in Behrens et al. (2009). Let's assume that a rm's cost
share of intermediates is zero. Then, the Cobb-Douglas unit cost functions and market clearing
conditions are (using that wi = 0 by choice of numeraire).










k=1 mkNk(tk)(1 ) 8 i = 1;:::;K; (A-4)
where ij  1 
ij : We assume symmetric transportation costs without loss of generality. Dene






















































the scalar r 
!
f , and let 1 be a vector of ones. Then, we can rewrite the free entry-and-exit
condition in matrix notation as
rt(1 )diag(t(1 )N) 1L = 1:









, N = rt( 1) 1diag( 1t( 1)1) 1L:



















where 'ij is an entry of  1. 'j 
PK
k=1 'jk(tk)( 1) is a cost-weighted measure of a country
j's inverse centrality (proximity to trade partners). The 'ij's and Lj's are exogenous variables.
So the number of varieties a country produces depends on its carbon tax and the size of all
trading partners weighted with a relative measure of their proximity { and thus on the carbon
tax of all other countries as well.
As in Behrens et al. (2009), it is useful to express the number of varieties in shares. Multi-
plying (A-4) by Ni and summing over all countries, we can show that the number of varieties







































Since  N is exogenously given, changes in the cost structure across countries (like changes in
climate policy) will shift the shares in varieties across the globe. Let i  Ni
 N be country i0s
share in world varieties and i  Li

























'j = i(ti)(1 ) and plugging into































































1Note that this result stems from assuming that xed costs are expressed as headquarter services and not in an
input bundle. This implies that rm size is not x and depends on marginal costs, i.e. climate policy. Otherwise,
the number of varieties available worldwide would depend on marginal costs.




j=x. If the exporter
increases its carbon tax, the import volume directly reacts with an elasticity of  . The second
term reects how varieties are shifted across the globe in response to x's higher carbon tax. This
indirect eect depends on trade costs between some country j and the importer, j's share in
varieties, and how this share changes relative to the exporter's share in varieties.


































So, the importer's scale eect is driven by the varieties (price index) channel only.
Special case: Two country world Let's assume we are in a two country world. The trade











A: We investigate the
trade ow Q12, i.e. country 1 is the importer, country 2 the exporter. The exporter's scale eect
is given by:




For an interior solution, all Fi's have to be positive; otherwise the respective Ni's are non-
positive. Thus, the sign of the second term depends on how the worldwide number of varieties











are positive, country 1's share in varieties rises when country 2 strengthens its climate policy.




1=2 is positive. Thus the exporter's scale eect Q;2 < 0. If the exporter imposes a
stricter climate policy, the import volume falls.
In the two country case, the importer's scale eect is
Q;1 =
(   1)F1   ;1F1
F1 + F2
:





1=2 is negative. Thus, the importer's scale eect Q;1 > 0. If the importer
imposes a stricter climate policy, the import volume rises.
A-5B Data Appendix
Input-output tables
The OECD collects input-output tables for its members and various other countries. Input-
output (I-O) tables are observed around the years 1995, 2000 and 2005. We apply the 1995
I-O table for the years 1995-98, the 2000 table for 1999-2002 and the 2005 table for 2003-07.
For 37 out of the 40 countries we have at least two I-O tables; Table ?? gives an overview
of availability for each country. For cases where no input-output table was available for the
years under investigation we chose the I-O table of the nearest year possible. This implies the
assumption that the economic structure (and specically the relative prices) has not changed
between these two points in time. The OECD I-O tables contain 48 industries, mostly on the
two digit level of the International Standard Industrial Classication of All Economic Activities
(ISIC) Revision 3. We aggregated these I-O industries to 15 sectors to match the emission data
of the IEA (see Table B-I). Implicitly, we assume that all products within a sector are produced
with the same CO2 intensity. The high level of sectoral aggregation in our analysis gives rise to
an aggregation bias when this assumption does not hold.2
Trade data
Bilateral trade data is obtained from the UN Comtrade database. It is translated from the
Standard International Trade Classication (SITC) Rev. 3 to ISIC Rev. 3 with an industry
concordance table provided by RAMON3. In the Comtrade database, imports are generally
valued with CIF prices, exports with FOB prices. In order to have the same valuation for
imports and exports, we use the FOB export price of the partner country as FOB price of
imports. Thereby we ignore the carbon dioxide emissions caused by international transportation.
For Russia, bilateral trade data is not available in the year 1995. Hence, we assume the trade
relations in 1995 to be as in 1996 and use trade data of 1996 for the Russian Federation. Prior
to 1999 bilateral trade data for Belgium and Luxembourg is reported jointly. Therefore trade,
output and emissions data of both countries is aggregated in all years. It is assumed that both
2There is a trade-o between sectoral detail and having harmonized data for a large set of countries. Since we
are interested in dierences in the carbon footprints of Kyoto and non-Kyoto countries, we chose to include as
many countries as possible at the cost of sectoral detail.
3http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/
A-6Table B-I: Industry classication
ISIC code Industry description
Traded Sectors
1 1+2, 5 Agriculture, forestry, shing
2 10-14,23,40 Electricity, gas and water supply,
mining and quarrying
3 27 Basic metals
4 24 Chemicals and petrochemicals
5 26 Other non-metallic mineral products
6 34+35 Transport equipment
7 28-32 Machinery
8 15+16 Food products, beverages, tobacco
9 21+22 Paper, paper products, pulp and printing
10 20 Wood and wood products
11 17-19 Textile and leather




15 41,50-52, Other services
55,63-99
countries produce with Belgian technology, i.e. we apply the Belgian I-O table to the region
Belgium-Luxembourg. Furthermore, service trade is assumed to be zero.
Sectoral CO2 emissions
Sectoral CO2 emissions are taken from the IEA CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion (detailed
estimates) Vol. 2009 database. The IEA estimates the CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion
with the default method and emission factors of dierent fuels suggested by the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change guidelines. Other sources of carbon dioxide emissions such as
fugitive emissions, industrial processes or waste are disregarded. However, CO2 emissions from
fuel combustion make up around 80% of total CO2 emissions. We also do not consider emissions
from international bunker fuels.
A-7Output data
In order to obtain the exporter's emission coecients, we need to divide sectoral emission levels
by some measure of sectoral output. This is the most challenging part of constructing our carbon
footprint database. Whenever possible, output data come from the OECD Structural Analysis
Database (STAN).4 STAN output data is available in current national currency only and was
converted to current U.S. dollars with the period average exchange rates from the IMF IFS
database. Even though the coverage of STAN data is excellent, some data points are missing.5
So country pairs with no information on the exporter's emission coecients are dropped from
the sample; which implies our database is unbalanced.
For countries not covered by STAN, sectoral output of the manufacturing industries was
taken from the INDSTAT2 2011 database which is given in ISIC Rev. 3.6 We complement this
with non-manufacturing output (sectors 1, 2, 13-15) obtained from the UN SNA database where
available, exceptions see below. In the SNA database, transport (ISIC 60-62) and storage (ISIC
63) are reported jointly, therefore our industry category 14 contains part of category 15 in those
countries. Manufacturing output is interpolated for the years 1995 and 1997 for South Africa. As
in the STAN database, some countries are not covered in all sample years and therefore dropped
as exporters. This is so for Argentina from 2003-07, Russia from 1995-2001 and Australia, Chile,
Israel, Mexico and Turkey in 2007.
For Australia, China, Indonesia, and Turkey non-manufacturing sectoral output (sectors 1,
2, 13-15) was not available in the UN SNA. Instead, we interpolate output data from the OECD
I-O tables. This gives imputed data for China and Indonesia from 1995-2005, Australia from
1998-2004, and Turkey from 1996-2002. I-O output data are again converted to U.S. dollars
with period average exchange rates from the IFS database.
4The 27 countries are Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland,
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States.
5Swiss data is missing in 1995-96, Canadian in 2006-07 and New Zealand and Portuguese in 2007.
6The remaining 13 countries are Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico,
Romania, Russia, South Africa, and Turkey.
A-8C Detailed Regression Results
Table C-I: Regressions on Pooled Data, Robustness Checks - Detailed Table
Panel A: Alternative measures of CO2 imports
(A1) (A2) (A3) (A4) (A5) (A6) (A7) (A8)
Measure: MRIO Technique xed MRIO I-O xed
Dependent variable: Ln CO2 intensity Ln CO2 imports Ln CO2 imports Ln CO2 imports
Method: FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Kyoto m -0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Kyoto x -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.10*** -0.16***
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Kyoto m-Kyoto x 0.02*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
ln GDP m 0.03** 1.89*** 1.86*** 1.87***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ln GDP x -1.22*** -0.14** 1.08*** 0.11*
(0.01) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Joint FTA (0,1) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Joint WTO (0,1) 0.01 -0.00 -0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.14 -0.08 -0.14
(0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Joint EU (0,1) 0.00 -0.00 -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
MR distance 0.00* -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MR contiguity -0.06*** 0.14** 0.20*** 0.17***
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
MR language 0.01** -0.01 -0.03 -0.02
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
MR FTA -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MR WTO 0.00 0.03** 0.03** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MR EU 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.01*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MR terms
a yes yes yes yes
Year eects yes yes yes yes
Country  year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 223,460 223,460 223,460 223,460 223,384 223,384 223,499 223,499
adj. R
2 0.65 0.71 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.05 0.06
Note: Standard errors (in brackets) corrected for clustering within country-pair; ***,** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a Multilateral resistance (MR) control variables (i.e., FTA,
WTO, EU, distance, contiguity, common language) constructed according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009).
A-9Table C-II: Regressions on Pooled Data, Robustness Checks - Detailed Table
Panel B: Alternative samples and estimators
(B1) (B2) (B3) (B4) (B5) (B6) (B7) (B8)
Sample: w/o China & transition countries
c Pre- and post-treatment averages
Dependent variable: Ln CO2 intensity Ln CO2 imports Ln CO2 intensity Ln CO2 imports
Method: FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Kyoto m -0.00 -0.00 0.03*** -0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Kyoto x 0.02*** -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.29***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Kyoto m-Kyoto x -0.02*** 0.03** 0.04*** 0.10***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
ln GDP m -0.08*** 2.14*** -0.03 1.05***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.15)
ln GDP x -0.98*** -0.68*** -1.26*** -0.60***
(0.03) (0.10) (0.04) (0.14)
Joint FTA (0,1) 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.11
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
Joint WTO (0,1) -0.03 -0.09 -0.38 -0.47
(0.08) (0.06) (0.35) (0.41)
Joint EU (0,1) 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.00 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07)
MR distance 0.02*** 0.12*** 0.01 -0.07***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
MR contiguity 0.02 0.45*** -0.10* 0.44**
(0.02) (0.07) (0.05) (0.22)
MR language -0.00 -0.05** -0.02 -0.21**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09)
MR FTA -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 0.04***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MR WTO -0.19*** -1.33*** 0.02*** 0.10***
(0.05) (0.17) (0.01) (0.03)
MR EU 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.03**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
MR terms
a yes yes yes yes
Year eects yes yes yes yes
Country  year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 136,392 136,392 136,392 136,392 36,269 36,269 36,269 36,269
adj. R
2 0.53 0.65 0.03 0.06 0.72 0.77 0.07 0.11
Note: Standard errors (in brackets) corrected for clustering within country-pair; ***,** and * denote statistical signif-
icance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a Multilateral resistance (MR) control variables (i.e., FTA, WTO,
EU, distance, contiguity, common language) constructed according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009).
c Transition
countries are CZE, EST, HUN, POL, ROU, RUS, SVN, SVK.
A-10Table C-III: Regressions on Pooled Data, Robustness Checks - Detailed Table
Panel C: Aggregate data
(C1) (C2) (C3) (C4) (C5) (C6) (C7) (C8)
Dependent variable: Ln CO2 intensity Ln CO2 imports
Method: FE FE FD FD FE FE FD FD
Kyoto m 0.02 0.00 0.20*** 0.05***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
Kyoto x -0.20*** -0.06*** -0.16*** -0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
Kyoto m-Kyoto x 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.13*** 0.04**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
ln GDP m 0.25*** 0.10 2.31*** 3.01***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.17)
ln GDP x -1.76*** -1.93*** -0.25 -0.93***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.17) (0.18)
Joint FTA (0,1) -0.11*** 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.07 -0.01 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)
Joint WTO (0,1) -0.12*** -0.52*** -0.07* -0.14 0.18 -1.37*** -0.10 -0.17
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.16) (0.12) (0.35) (0.10) (0.20)
Joint EU (0,1) 0.10*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.01 -0.05* -0.08* -0.00 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)
MR distance -0.02*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
MR contiguity 0.15** -0.02 0.34*** 0.04
(0.07) (0.04) (0.11) (0.06)
MR language -0.11*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.03**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
MR FTA 0.04 0.01 -0.09 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)
MR WTO 0.14*** -0.01 0.09 0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.08) (0.05)
MR EU 0.02 0.07*** 0.11** 0.11***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
MR terms
a yes yes yes yes
Year eects yes yes yes yes
Country  year FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 15422 15422 13864 13864 15422 15422 13864 13864
adj. R
2 0.56 0.60 0.16 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.06 0.09
Note: Standard errors (in brackets) corrected for clustering within country-pair; ***,** and * denote statistical
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
a Multilateral resistance (MR) control variables (i.e., FTA,
WTO, EU, distance, contiguity, common language) constructed according to Baier and Bergstrand (2009).
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